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Abstract
This paper treats the problem of copyright protection. Many works
state that strong copyright protection increases producer’s surplus and
decreases consumer’s surplus, but we argue that it is doubtful We use
a repeated game to analyze this problem, and show that weakening
copyright protection may improve economic welfare in the sense of
Pareto.
1 Introduction
The problem finding the optimal level of copyright protection became a se-
rxous economic problem. This problem started since several years ago ac-
companying with the problem of digital copy, especially illegal copy of music
files.
To understand this problem, we need to consider why copyright is needed.
Firstly, suppose no copyright exists. The cost of copying is usually much
cheeper than that of creating, so we can assume this cost is zero. If the
original author sells his works, other firms can copy and sell it with cost
zero. Because of competition, the price tends to zero, so the original author
suffers a big loss. Therefore, he doesn’t try to sell his works. Next, suppose
copyright exists and is so strong that no firms can copy and sell. Then the
original author can gain positive profit. It is not good for economy, however,
because the author gains monopolistic profit.
Therefore, too high or too low level of copyright protection is undesirable.
So we want to know the optimal level of copyright protection. Many works
consider that high level copyright protection increases producer’s surplus and
decreases consumer’s surplus1 .
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The aim of this paper is to submit a theoretical counter example on this
statement. Some firms allow consumer to try their software as long as he
likes. Other firms allow consumer to use their software freely, and depend
on the donation from users2. The fact these softwares exist and manage as
usual tells us an important point. In these examples, author abandons the
right to receive money, but his profit is not equal to zero,
Remember our explanation why copyright is needed. We considered the
price competition between the author and the copy firms. In usual price
competition it is assumed if the price of one firm is not the minimum price,
then the sales of his products must be zero, because consumers can buy
it from other firms whose price is lower than him. A principle behind this
assumption is that; consumers always prefer the cheapest pa ment. However,
the case in the previous paragraph is a counter example.
Existence of this counter example raises a question. Examples show that
even if no copyright protection exists, the author can gain positive profit. Can
no copyright protection improve economic welfare, in the sense of Pareto?
We analyze this problem in the framework of repeated game, and answer
this question positively. One example is the case in which consumers’ het-
erogeneity is very large. It is treated in section 2. The other example is
the case in which an uncertainty about the value of works exists, treated in
section 3.
2 The case under large heterogeneity
Consider a repeated game with one supplier and $n$ consumers. $\parallel$ $=\{0$ , ,.., $n\}$
means a player set, and player 0 denotes supplier. Game proceeds below. In
the beginning of each period $t$ , supplier chooses “make’7 (M) or “halt” (B), If
supplier chooses $H$ , period $t$ finishes and every player gains payoff 0. If not,
supplier determines a price $p_{t}$ from $[0, \infty)^{3}$ . Consumers choose “buy” (B) ,
“don’t use” (B), or “copy” (C) simultaniously. The payoff of consumer $\mathrm{i}$ at $t$
1s
$u_{i}-p_{t}$ if his action is $B$
$u_{i}-Xp_{\mathrm{f}}$ if his action is $C$
0 otherwise
where the term $X$ denotes the level of copyright protection. We consider
only two different types of $X$ . One is the case $X=0$, called no copyright
$2\mathrm{S}\mathrm{t}\mathrm{r}\mathrm{e}\mathrm{e}\mathrm{t}$ paxformance is another example in which the profit of supplier depends on the
donation.
$3\mathrm{W}\mathrm{e}$ don’t assume that supplier determines $p_{t}$ from $\mathrm{R}$ , because total payoff function
cannot become well-defined
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protection case. Another is the case $X=1$ , called full copyright protection
case. If $k_{t}$ consumers choose $B$ and $l_{t}$ consumers choose $C$ , the payoff of
supplier at period $t$ is $ktpt+Xl_{t}p_{t}-c$ . The term $c$ denotes cost to make his
works. The total payoff of each player is total sum of payoff with discount
rate $\delta$ , that is, if player $\mathrm{i}$ gains payoff $x_{i}^{t}$ in period $t$ , his total payoff is
$\sum_{t=1}^{\infty}\delta^{t-1}x_{i}^{t}$ .
The situation this game expresses is here. Supplier can make his works
or not. If he chooses to make it, he must pay a fixed cost $c$ . Suppose that
supplier chooses to make his works. If consumer $\mathrm{i}$ buys and consumes it, he
gains the payoff $u_{i}$ and loses $pf$ dollars. In no copyright protection case(that
is, $X=0$), he can copy freely and consume this works. In full copyright
protection case(X $=1$ ), he cannot copy and must buy works if he wants to
consume it. Of course, he can ignore supplier’s works.
We can find a general result in the case of no copyright protection.
theorem 2.1 Suppose $X=0$ and $U=u_{1}+\ldots+u_{n}>c$. For every $v\in \mathrm{R}_{++}^{n+1}$
such that $v_{i}\leq u_{i}$ for every $\mathrm{i}=1$ , $\ldots$ , $n$ and $v_{0}+\ldots+v_{n}=U-c$ , if 1– $\delta$ is




proof We consider the sequence of actions $(a_{0}^{t}, \ldots, a_{n}^{t})_{t}$ such that if $t\equiv$
$i(\mathrm{m}\mathrm{o}\mathrm{d} n)$ , supplier chooses $a_{0}^{t}=(M,$ $\frac{1-\delta^{n}}{\delta^{i-1}(1-\delta)}(u_{i}-v_{i}))$ , only player $\mathrm{i}$
chooses $a_{i}^{t}=B$ , and other players choose $a_{j}^{t}=C$ . This sequence of actions
attains desired payoff. Next, we consider a trigger strategy $(s_{0}, \ldots, s_{n})$ such
that in period $t^{*}$ , player $\mathrm{i}$ takes $a_{i}^{t^{*}}$ if there was no action differs from $a_{i}^{t}$ for
any $t<t^{*}$ , and $H(\mathrm{i}\mathrm{f}\mathrm{i}=0)$ or $N(\mathrm{i}\neq 0)$ otherwise. By the method similar to
the proof of folk theorem, it can be shown that if $1-\delta$ is sufficiently small,
then $(s_{0}, \ldots, s_{n})$ is a Nash equilibrium, $\blacksquare$
example 1 (first example copyright protection is not effective)
Suppose $n=2$ , $u_{1}=0.9$ , $u_{2}=0.2$ and $c=1$ . At first, we show that there
is no equilibrium in which both consumers can consume the works for every
period $t$ under the case $X=1$ . We use reductio ad absurdum. Suppose
not. Every player has the minimax value 0, so that, in equilibrium the payoff
vector must belong to $\mathrm{R}_{+}^{3}$ . The payoff of player 2 is
$\sum_{t=1}^{\infty}\delta^{t-1}(0.2 -p_{b})\geq 0$ .
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So, the payoff of player 0 is
$\sum_{t=1}^{\infty}\delta^{t-1}(2p_{t}-1)<0$ ,
a contradiction.
Therefore, in equilibrium the payoff vector $U^{*}=$ $(U_{0}^{*}, U_{1}^{*}, U_{2}^{*})$ satisfies
$(1-\delta)(U_{0}^{*}+U_{1}^{*}+U_{2}^{*})<0.1$ and $0\leq U_{i}^{*}$ . So, we can find a vector $v\in \mathrm{R}^{3}$
such that $v_{0}+v_{1}+v_{2}=0.1$ and $v_{l}>(1-\delta)U_{i}^{*}\geq 0$ . Also, we can check $v_{i}<u_{i}$
for $\mathrm{i}=1,2^{4}$ . Using above theorem, we find an equilibrium under $X=0$ such
that the payoff vecter is $\underline{1}v>U^{*}$ . Therefore, every equilibrium under
$1-\delta$
$X=1$ is Pareto dominated by some equilibrium under $X=0$ . $\blacksquare$
Next proposition suggests that above example depends on the fact $u_{1}$
largely differs from $u_{2}$ .
proposition 2.1 Suppose u $=u_{1}=u_{2}= \ldots=u_{n}>\frac{c}{n}$ . Then, there is an
equilibrium such that all consumers can consume the works even if X $=1$ .
proof the couple of actions $a=$ $((M, u)$ , $B$ , ..., $B$ ) is a Nash equilibrium
of component game. So the couple of strategy such that every player takes
action $a$ regardless of history is a Nash equilibrium of repeated game. $\blacksquare$
Next proposition is the opposite of above.
proposition 2.2 Suppose U $=u_{1}+\ldots+u_{n}<c$ . Then supplier never chooses
M in equilibrium even if X $=0$ .
proof Since 0 is the minimax point, the equilibrium payoff vector $U^{*}=$
$(U_{0}^{*}$ , . . . , $U_{n}^{*})$ must belong to $\mathrm{R}_{+}^{n+1}$ . If supplier chooses $M$ in period $t_{\}}$ then the
sum of payoff in period $t$ must be less than 0. Otherwise, the sum of payoff
equal to 0. So if once supplier chooses $M$ , $U_{0}^{*}+\ldots+U_{n}^{*}<0$ , a contradiction.
$\blacksquare$
3 The case under some uncertainty
The last proposition of section 2 seems to be obvious. However, if there is
some uncertainty about the value of works, we can find a counter example
of this proposition. In this section, we consider this example.
$4\mathrm{F}\mathrm{o}\mathrm{r}$ example, $v_{0}+v_{2}\geq 0$ means $v_{1}\leq 0.1$ $<u_{1}$ .
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The model considered in this section is similar to in previous section,
except if supplier chooses to make his works in period $t$ , the value of works
$x^{t}=$ $(x_{1}^{t}$ , . . ., $x_{n}^{t})_{t}$ determined randomly. Supplier cannot know $x^{t}$ until the
end of period ?. Consumer $\mathrm{i}$ can know $x_{i}^{t}$ if he consumes works. In full
copyright protection case, consumer cannot consume it except he Pays $p$
dollers. Contrastively, in no copyright protection case, consumer can copy
and consume it freely, and determines to buy or not to buy depending on $x_{i}^{t}$ .
The payoff of supplier is the same as previous section. The payoff of
consumer is rather changing. If he doesn’t choose $N$ , it is expressed by
function $u_{i}(x,p^{*})$ , where $x$ denotes the value of works and $p^{*}$ the payment.
If he chooses $N$ , then his payoff is $0^{5}$ .
example 2 (second example copyright protection is not effective)
Suppose $n=1$ , $c=0.08$ , $u(x,p^{*})=-e^{-10(x-p^{*})}+0.17$ and $x^{t}$ is independent
of $t$ and has an uniform distribution on $[0, 1]^{6}$ .
Firstly, we consider the case of full copyright protection. Suppose $W_{t}$
denotes the sum of expected payoffs at period $t$ . If supplier chooses $H$ at
period $t$ , then $W_{t}=0$ . If supplier chooses $M$ and consumer chooses $N$ , then
$W_{t}=-0.08$ . Otherwise,
$W_{t}=p-0.08$ $-E[e^{-10x+10p}+0.17]$ $=p+ \frac{e^{10p}(e^{-10}-1)}{10}+0.09$
which depends on $p$ . To maximize $W$ , it increases to $\frac{-\log(1-e^{-10})}{10}-0.01<$
$0$ where $p= \frac{-\log(1-e^{-10})}{10}$ . So $W_{t}\geq 0$ if and only if supplier chooses $H$ at
period $t$ . Recall that both players have the minimax value 0. Therefore, in
equilibrium payoffs must be larger than 0. It means supplier must not choose
$M$ in equilibrium.
Next, we treat the case of no copyright protection. Consider a pair of
actions $a=(M, \frac{1}{10})$ and $b=(B( \mathrm{i}\mathrm{f}x\geq\frac{1}{10}), C(\mathrm{o}\mathrm{t}\mathrm{h}\mathrm{e}\mathrm{r}\mathrm{w}\mathrm{i}\mathrm{s}\mathrm{e}))^{7}$ . The expected
payoff of supplier is $0.01>0$ . The expected payoff of consumer is
$\frac{1}{10}(e^{-1}-1)+\frac{e}{10}(e^{-10}-e^{-1})+0.17=\frac{1}{10e}+\frac{1}{10e^{9}}-0.03>0$.
Because of the folk theorem, there exists a Nash equilibrium such that players
choose action $(a, b)$ for every period $t$ . The payoff of both player in such
equilibrium must be larger than 0.
$\overline{\mathrm{s}_{\mathrm{N}\mathrm{o}\mathrm{t}\mathrm{i}\mathrm{c}\mathrm{e}}}$that wedon’tassume that $u_{i}(0,0)=0$ .
$6\mathrm{I}\mathrm{f}$ the number of supplier is truely one, the assumption $x^{t}$ is independent of $t$ is so
strong that it is not practical. Therefore, we explain the supplier includes infinitely many
people in fact. One supplier chooses to make or not and retires at the end of period.
$7\mathrm{W}\mathrm{e}$ can explain the action $b$ , “use as a trial and buy if he likes it”
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In this example, consumer is risk-averse and supplier is risk-neutral. Con-
sumer can impose his risk on supplier in no copyright protection case, but
it cannot in full copyright protection case. So the supremum of the sum of
expected payoff in no copyright case may become larger than in full copy-
right case. That is the reason why weakened copyright protection improves
economic welfare. $\blacksquare$
This example shows that no copyright protection may be much better
than full copyright protection under uncertainty. In example 1, every equi-
librium payoff on full copyright protection is dominated by some equilibrium
payoff on no copyright protection. On the other hand, in example 2 full
copyright protection interrupts supplier makes his works, so that, every equi-
librium payoff on full copyright protection must be equal to 0. Therefore,
every equilibrium payoff on full copyright protection is dominated by every
equilibrium payoff on no copyright protection.
4 Conclusion
Example 1 treats the case in which consumers’ heterogeneity is very large,
and shows that weak copyright protection may improve economic welfare.
Example 2 deals with the case in which there is some uncertainty on value
of works, and shows that strong copyright protection may disable supplier
from making his works.
Both examples reveal that strong copyright protection is often not effec-
tive 1n the sense of Pareto. So we should be careful to strengthen the level
of copyright protection.
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